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I. Introduction  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have undertaken a serious 
effort to convert their nuclear complexes to non-weapons work. However, it has been 
difficult to achieve significant progress toward this goal. Since the conversion process is 
very important for both countries, it seemed timely to review the successes and problems 
encountered to date and to evaluate and recommend new approaches for action. As a first 
step, the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) sought to 
identify more effective methods of facilitating conversion activities at five key Russian 
nuclear facilities. These included the two nuclear weapon design laboratories, Arzamas-
16 and Chelyabinsk-70, and the three plutonium production and separation facilities, 
Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26, and Chelyabinsk-65. A meeting on this subject was convened 
in Moscow on May 24 and 25, 1997.  
The goal of the meeting was to generate new ideas that would allow the U.S. and Russian 
governments to build on existing conversion efforts, perhaps as part of a new initiative 
launched under the auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC). The 
principal participants from Russia included the First Deputy Minister of the Ministry for 
Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, the Directors of Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70 
and Tomsk-7, and the Chief Engineer of Krasnoyarsk-26. Additional details on the 
participants and the agenda are located in Annexes One and Two. A synopsis of the 
presentations made by the Russian participants is located in Annex Three.  
II. Recommendations for Expanded Joint Cooperation  
Based on the presentations made at the May meeting and subsequent discussions, 
RANSAC has concluded that there are three specific areas where additional U.S.-Russian 
cooperation could be useful.  
   
1. Cooperative Nuclear Security. In this area, one important new initiative is the creation 
of dedicated arms control and non-proliferation analysis centers at Arzamas-16, 
Chelyabinsk-70 and the Kurchatov Institute. These centers would parallel the capabilities 
that exist at U.S. national laboratories. As a first step perhaps a small number of U.S. 
national laboratories and universities could fund fellows from the Russian nuclear 
complex to work on security issues in the U.S. These fellows could gain experience by 
working with similar centers at the U.S. labs, and also be exposed to the U.S. non-
governmental national security community. Another proposal is the creation of a joint 
Russian-American research program on issues related to the transparency and 
irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process. This can expand current efforts by 
focusing on issues related to the trilateral initiative, verification of warhead 
dismantlement as called for in the Helsinki Statement, plutonium disposition and the data 
exchange.  
   
2. Environmental Restoration. There is a small U.S.-Russian program of cooperation in 
this area that should be expanded. One way to facilitate expanded cooperation is to use 
the laboratory-to-laboratory approach that has been so successful in the nuclear security 
area. In this case, Mayak, Tomsk-7 and Kransnoyarsk-26 could form partnerships with 
Hanford, Oak Ridge and Savannah River. There are three steps that could be taken 
initially. One is to evaluate the progress that has been made in the many Russian clean-up 
technology projects that have been financed under the International Science and 
Technology Center (ISTC) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program. 
Russian specialists should also become familiar with the technologies the U.S. has 
developed as part of its environmental restoration effort. And, U.S. and Russian experts 
should jointly develop technologies for cleaning up waste problems that both countries 
face. If initial efforts are successful, a portion of U.S. clean-up research and development 
could be contracted to Russian technologists. A related issue is to conduct an evaluation 
of a new technology for plutonium-contaminated waste immobilization developed at 
Krasnoyarsk-26. Finally, there is the question of whether Russian nuclear facilities would 
be willing to serve as test beds for the demonstration of new technologies developed in 
Russia and abroad.  
   
3. Product Commercialization. This is obviously the most important area for the long-
term transition of the complex, but it is also the most difficult to master. Perhaps the most 
important issue in the short term is to evaluate the commercial potential of the 
technologies put forth during and after the May meeting. One approach is to ask some 
combination of the ISTC, IPP, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation OPIC), and 
the Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF) to create a government-private industry committee to 
evaluate these proposals and select the most promising projects. Once selected, a 
commercialization "Tiger Team" could be formed for each project to assist with the 
development of business plans, market analyses and legal issues. This is similar to the 
approach being taken with the silicon plant planned for Krasnoyarsk-26. A related issue 
is the need to improve the business and financial training available to the specialists in 
the nuclear cities and to encourage the hiring of trained business experts. A number of 
initiatives are possible in this area, but one initial suggestion is to host Russian fellows at 
U.S. universities where they can be trained in relevant disciplines. 
In order to expand the substantive areas of collaboration, both governments must tackle 
the difficult issue of financing. To improve the chances of securing U.S. financing it 
would be useful if Russia would cost share, or provide matching funds, for the new 
initiatives. One suggestion is for Russia to use a portion of the payments it receives from 
the U.S. under the highly-enriched uranium blend-down agreement as a potential source 
of funding for this initiative. As a first step it would be useful if Russia would consider 
making five percent of the total yearly income from this sale available for the nuclear 
complex conversion effort. For example, in 1998, when Russia will blend-down 24 tons 
of HEU, five percent of the income would amount to over $30 million. The U.S. could 
then seek to match this amount, perhaps by devoting a portion of the IPP budget to this 
agenda as well tapping other programs. A proposed first year budget is located in Annex 
Four.  
In addition to financing, there are a number of additional issues that the U.S. and Russian 
governments should consider to help facilitate the transition of the nuclear complexes. On 
the U.S. side, the government needs to re-evaluate its existing domestic and international 
conversion programs and determine if they have the correct focus. A first step in this 
effort should be the convening of a U.S.-Russian conference on the lessons that the U.S. 
has learned during its nuclear complex conversion process. Also, the IPP program should 
be reviewed and perhaps directed to focus solely on the conversion of Russia's nuclear 
cities. Additionally, the U.S. has viewed its various nuclear safety and security 
collaborations with Russia as individual efforts, not part of an overall strategy for 
conversion and stabilization. This should change to some degree. While all activities 
should be implemented separately to maintain their effectiveness, their budgets and 
progress should be centrally tracked. This will allow both governments to have a clear 
idea of how much money is being spent on the conversion effort and how effectively the 
programs are performing. From the Russian side, it would be useful to have further 
information in three areas: (1) barriers to collaboration between the nuclear cities and the 
oil and gas industry; (2) the current tax structure and ideas for tax incentives for 
investment in the nuclear cities; and (3) legal issues that affect investment, including the 
rules regarding access to facilities. Perhaps all of these U.S. and Russian issues could be 
studied by a joint Russian-American team that is chartered by the GCC.  
In considering the full range of proposals that were made at the May meeting, the 
members of RANSAC decided that it would not be productive to address the issues of 
expanded U.S-Russian cooperation on nuclear reactor technology development and 
utilization or on nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship in these initial recommendations. 
These issues are very controversial and could detract from the importance of expanded 
cooperation on conversion. However, these are issues of interest to RANSAC and future 
discussions on them will occur.  
Also, experience has proven that Russian-American cooperation benefits both nations 
best when there are an agreed-upon set of milestones and means of measuring the success 
of new initiatives. In this case, progress could be monitored by requiring that a report be 
issued at each meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. The measurements in the 
report could include: a display of actual products produced under this initiative; before 
and after pictures and video tapes of projects; a statistical report on the number of 
contracts and number of new employees created by the initiative; and a catalog of private 
investment in individual commercial projects.  
III. Initial Implementation Plan  
Since it is often difficult to implement new projects, RANSAC believed that it would be 
useful to suggest some specific activities that could be taken as first steps in an expanded 
collaboration. The following is an attempt to lay out an initial implementation plan for 
the period of September 1997 to February 1998. These activities should be agreed upon 
at the September GCC and accomplished before the next GCC meeting in January or 
February 1998. The proposals encompass the three key areas of cooperation, non-
proliferation, environmental restoration and product commercialization. Specific steps 
include:  
• The convening of a conference on the U.S. experience on the conversion of its 
nuclear complex. This conference should be hosted by the U.S. laboratories and 
be held in the U.S. The Russian participation should be very broad, including the 
top officials of the nuclear facilities, and First Deputy Minister Ryabev should be 
invited to lead the Russian delegation. The conference should set aside time for a 
small group discussion between U.S. and Russian lab directors on what additional 
collaborations could be initiated. The outcome should be a specific list of 
potential future collaborations aimed at conversion. 
• Two U.S. labs and two U.S. universities (perhaps Princeton and Harvard) should 
agree to host a fellow from Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16 for three months 
each. The purpose would be to expose this person to the workings of a national 
laboratory arms control and non-proliferation operation and a similar organization 
in the non-governmental sector. The Russian candidates must be of good quality 
(i.e. arms control and non-proliferation backgrounds and good English language 
skills). The outcome should be to create the catalyst for the formation of similar 
arms control and non-proliferation centers at the Russian labs. 
• A conference should be held between officials from Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26, 
Mayak, Savanah River, Oak Ridge and Hanford on the common environmental 
problems that exist at these facilities and the existing and proposed methods for 
cleaning them up, including cooperative development efforts. The outcome 
should be to determine areas where the U.S. and Russia can expand collaboration 
on the development and use of technologies for environmental restoration. 
• The Russian laboratories should be asked to give to the U.S. a list of their top 
potential commercial products. These proposals should be reviewed by a 
combined team, including members from the ISTC, IPP, DEF and OPIC offices. 
ISTC and IPP can comment on the soundness of the technology and OPIC and 
DEF on the possibility for financing. The outcome should be to choose the most 
promising commercial products and follow through with a joint Russian-
American team of experts (government and non-government) that can see the 
process through to completion. 
• In series with the ISTC/IPP/DEF/OPIC review, a conference should be convened 
on how to produce a business plan. All relevant Russian institutions should be 
invited. U.S. laboratories have already done substantial work in this area. The 
outcome should be that the Russian participants come away with an 
understanding of business plan development and its importance. Follow-up 
meetings could be scheduled. 
• A Russian-American evaluation team should be formed to look at the proposals 
from Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 related to the oil and gas industry and the 
impediments to their implementation. These proposals have included perforators 
for old wells, new monitoring and control systems for pipelines, and 
environmental protection technologies. The outcome should be to identify 
technologies that can be utilized by Russian and foreign oil and gas companies 
and identify impediments to their use in Russia. To get these initial activities 
underway the U.S. and Russia should split the financing. All together the six 
activities outlined above should not cost more than $3-5 million. The Russian 
money should come from the HEU purchase and the U.S. seed money should 
come from the Department of Energy (DoE). Progress can be measured by 
preparing a short report for the January/February 1998 GCC on the 
accomplishments of the last six months, the suggestions for next steps, and a 
proposed budget for the follow-on activities. 
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ANNEX TWO 
 Agenda 
 The Nuclear Weapons Complex: 
Meeting the Conversion Challenge 
 A Workshop Convened by the 
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council 
 May 24-25, 1997 
 Russian Academy for State Service 
Moscow 
Saturday, May 24, 1997  
9:30  
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Kenneth Luongo, Executive Director   
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council   
Lev Ryabev, First Deputy Minister   
Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation   
Yevgeny Velikhov, Member   
Defense Council of the Russian Federation  
10:30  
Presentation of Proposals   
Radiy Ilkaev, Director   
All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-
16)  
11:30  Break  
11:45  
Presentation of Proposals   
Yevgeny Avrorin, Director   
All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-
70)  
12:45  Lunch  
2:00  
Presentation of Proposals   
Gennadiy Khandorin, Director   
Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7)  
3:00  
Presentation of Proposals   
Yuri Revenko, Chief Engineer   
Mining and Chemical Combine (Krasnoyarsk-26)  
3:30  Break  
4:00  
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Lev Ryabev   
Ministry of Atomic Energy  
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Los Alamos National Laboratory   
William Dunlop   
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory   
Steve Mladineo   
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory   
Randy Beatty   
International Science and Technology Center  
5:00  General Discussion of Proposals  
7:00  Dinner for all Participants   Restaurant "U Pirosmany"  
Sunday, May 25, 1997  
10:00  Convening of RANSAC Meeting   (RANSAC members)  
 
ANNEX THREE 
 Presentations by the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Nuclear Cities 
View of the Ministry of Atomic Energy  
The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) is a major industrial force in Russia 
that employs close to 800,000 workers in its numerous institutes, businesses and 
nuclear weapons complex. While still powerful, Minatom no longer commands 
the share of the federal budget that it was accorded during the Cold War. As a 
result, its workers are subject to the same wage delays that other large industries 
in Russia are experiencing. This situation is not likely to be reversed as long as 
the budget crisis in Russia persists.  
The Ministry is trying to develop alternative sources of funding for its nuclear 
weapons complex and has generated a three-point plan for how the transition 
should proceed:  
1. Fundamental and Applied Science. This includes high-energy physics, 
controlled fusion, nuclear physics, the physics of solids, and semiconductor 
science. Minatom hopes that this research will result in commercial products.  
   
2. Nuclear Power. This work focuses on the development of a new generation of 
civilian nuclear reactors, safety upgrades at existing reactors, and the construction 
of new power plants. The new reactors, if built, will help to support the fuel 
manufacturing and machine building components of the Minatom complex.  
   
3. Commercial Products. Numerous ideas for commercial products have been 
generated throughout the complex. Some have recently come to fruition at 
Chelyabinsk-70 and Krasnoyarsk-45.  
Two additional areas discussed at the workshop, and of interest to the Ministry, 
are expansion of activities to facilitate the nuclear disarmament process and 
environmental clean-up.  
The Ministry has two sources of funding for its conversion efforts. One source is 
mandated under the Law on Dangerous Radioactive Facilities. Under this 
legislation, 1.5% to 3% of facility revenues are to be directed to conversion 
activities. Unfortunately, this provision suffers from non-payment. The second 
source of revenue is exports of nuclear materials and equipment and international 
collaborations. In 1996, Minatom estimates that it brought in $2 billion from these 
activities, about one-third of its total budget. Under this category, Minatom has 
received permission from the government to use a portion of the proceeds from 
the HEU purchase agreement for conversion activities.  
In general, the Ministry recognizes that Russia does not have the resources 
required to keep the existing nuclear complex fully funded, but little thought has 
been given to the idea of consolidating or closing down parts of the complex. 
Instead, Minatom would like to see most of its nuclear complex become self-
sufficient by producing and selling commercial products.  
All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16)  
Arzamas-16, located near the city of Nizhni Novgorod, is one of two major 
nuclear weapon design laboratories in Russia. At present the institute employs 
approximately 20,000 nuclear specialists. The institute's defense conversion 
philosophy is based on the premise that large-scale cutbacks in employment will 
not be pursued. The primary reasons given for this approach are the need to 
reduce the possibility of social problems and also to reduce the outflow of 
scientists who have specialized knowledge of military technologies. The objective 
of the Arzamas leadership, therefore, is to create jobs. The most important and 
interesting work in its view is scientific research, including large-scale science 
projects and industrial technology development.  
At the May meeting, Arzamas-16's suggestions for future scientific research 
focused on: the expanded use of the laboratory's existing nuclear reactors; 
development of a nuclear reactor powered laser and laser driven inertial 
confinement fusion; development of tritium targets for ITER; and isotope 
separation. Other suggestions for new work included expanded activity related to 
the protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials; development of 
supercomputers based on parallel processing; technology development for 
emergency response to nuclear warhead accidents; restoration of radioactively 
contaminated areas; development of containers for chemical weapons, fissile 
material and spent nuclear fuel; activities related to the disposition of plutonium; 
and issues related to the detection, use and disposal of high explosives. An area of 
commercial potential was cooperation with the oil and gas industry of Russia 
which has a need for better pipeline controls, monitoring, and reliability analysis 
and perforation technologies to intensify production. In June, Arzamas submitted 
further detail on some of these proposals and made additional suggestions for 
projects. These included the development of containers for the transportation and 
storage of silicon chips and the use of pulsed reactors and accelerometers to 
improve the safety of nuclear reactors.  
The leadership of the institute is pessimistic that large-scale industrial production 
can work as a sole conversion strategy because it would require considerable 
investment and significant changes in employee psychology. However, the 
institute is interested in small-scale production activities. To this end, Arzamas-16 
is working to establish cooperation with Russian institutes and companies as well 
as international entities. To date, the effort has been focused on the conversion of 
highly experienced experts and these scientists have established good contacts 
through the International Science and Technology Center and U.S.-sponsored lab-
to-lab programs. Finding alternative employment for the workers and technicians 
at the institute is a more serious problem.  
At present the yearly budget for Arzamas-16 is $130 million and the yearly 
revenue is composed of funding from the state budget, international cooperation 
projects and commercial work for industry. The latter two categories each account 
for approximately 7% of the yearly revenue (15% total) and the goal is to increase 
the contributions from these areas three fold ( to reach approximately 50% of the 
yearly revenues). Recently, salaries from the state have been running about one-
half a year late and the institute has borrowed money to make up the budgetary 
shortfall.  
All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (Chelyabinsk-70)  
Chelyabinsk-70, located between the cities of Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk, is 
Russia's other major nuclear weapons design laboratory. It has been in existence 
since 1955. At present Chelyabinsk-70 has approximately 15,000 employees. The 
Chelyabinsk-70 philosophy of conversion is to utilize the highly skilled technical 
employees and technical capabilities that exist at the institute. An area of 
particular interest for Chelyabinsk-70 is the expanded use of advanced computers 
for work in the areas of shock waves, detonations, turbulent mixing, technology 
testing (mechanical impact, vibration, climatic), and computational physics.  
Like Arzamas-16, Chelyabink-70 expressed a clear preference for pursuing 
research at the laboratory as a substitute for weapons work. Suggestions included 
the development of environmental restoration technologies; plutonium disposition 
research; nuclear power plant safety enhancement; development of medical 
equipment; and the application of high-efficiency lasers.  
Chelyabinsk-70 also presented a number of proposals that had potential 
commercial applications. Three that seemed most developed were superplastic 
forming of metal components, production of perforators for the oil industry and 
the production of quartz for use in fiber optic technologies. The superplastic 
forming technology has applications in the aerospace and automobile industries 
and is currently supported by the ISTC and IPP. The need for oil well perforators 
is well established, but there are questions about how Russian laws affect the 
extraction of oil from old wells. The production of fiber optic lines has gained the 
support of some Russian ministries and one bank. In particular, the railroad 
industry in Russia has indicated its interest in utilizing fiber optics and a small 
pilot factory for production has been set up at Chelyabinsk. It was estimated that 
fiber optic production alone could create 1,000 jobs at Chelyabinsk. In June, 
Chelyabinsk-70 submitted some more detailed proposals focused on 
environmental restoration and technologies for use in the oil and gas industry. It 
also suggested additional activities focused on the decontamination and 
dismantlement of nuclear reactors, and the production of antiseptics.  
While some commercial projects seem within the grasp of Chelyabinsk-70, the 
leadership of laboratory expressed great frustration with the process of 
commercializing its promising technologies. The problems were both internal and 
external. Internally, the institute does not have the people with the right 
background or training for marketing and commercializing products. Externally, 
the laboratory is having great difficulty finding and interacting with key business 
people from Russia, the U.S. and elsewhere that might be interested in their 
products. If commercial activities could be arranged, they could be organized as 
joint stock operations or small enterprises that would be managed separately from 
the laboratory and the production line established in a location that did not require 
special permission for access. This is similar to the approach outlined by 
Arzamas-16.  
The laboratory is also interested in expanding the amount of work that it does in 
the non-proliferation area. In particular the laboratory is interested in the design 
and development of its own detectors and software for use in the protection, 
control and accounting of nuclear materials; improving training in the weapons 
complex in the methodologies and technologies used in MPC&A; enhancing the 
transparency of the nuclear warhead dismantlement process; developing 
technologies for the detection of clandestine nuclear activities worldwide; and 
improving verification technologies for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Related to this area, was the suggestion by Chelyabinsk-70 that the laboratory 
create better contacts with U.S. universities to work on analytical issues related to 
arms control and non-proliferation issues. The leadership noted with regret that 
cooperation with the United States on the issues related to the safety and 
reliability of nuclear weapons was a possible area of growth, but that the results to 
date had been disappointing.  
At present, the yearly budget for Chelyabinsk-70 is approximately $100 million, 
with revenue generated by the state budget (70%), sales of heat, communications 
capabilities, and transportation services to the population of Chelyabinsk-70 (20%) 
and international contracts (9%). Of the 15,000 employees at the laboratory, the 
Chelyabinsk-70 leadership expects only 5,000 to be actively employed in 
military-related activities by 2010. Therefore, the laboratory would like to see its 
dependency on the military budget decrease to about 33% of the revenue total and 
have another one-third generated by commercial projects, international 
cooperation and applied science activities. The laboratory would like to have the 
final one-third of the budget generated by fundamental science activities, but 
these historically have been financed by the state budget. Whether the funding for 
these activities will be available from past sources is uncertain.  
Mining and Chemical Combine (Krasnoyarsk-26)  
Kransoyarsk-26 is a major plutonium production, processing and storage facility 
that is located near the city of Krasnoyarsk. At present the facility employs 
approximately 9,400 workers at its plutonium production reactors, radiochemical 
plant and supporting infrastructure. Its yearly budget is estimated at $30 million. 
The primary conversion focus of the institute had been to complete the 
construction of the RT-2 nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, but this project now 
seems unlikely to proceed. A revised approach has three elements. The most 
immediate is the conversion of the core of the one operating plutonium production 
reactor and the ultimate replacement of this reactor. Another is the eventual shut 
down of the existing radiochemical plant when its reprocessing and waste 
processing missions are completed. The third element is the creation of viable 
commercial products.  
The replacement of the existing plutonium production reactor has been a long-
term Russian objective that has been incorporated into a Russian-American joint 
effort. This project is currently focused on converting the core of the reactor as a 
first step toward the goal of ending the production of weapon-grade plutonium. 
But a replacement for the reactor ultimately must be found. Replacement is 
essential because the reactor produces heat for the surrounding area. At present 
there are two alternatives. The option preferred by the Ministry of Atomic Energy 
is to build a new VK-300 reactor, though this would cost billions. The other 
alternative, preferred by the local government, is to complete the Sosnovoborsk 
fossil fuel plant, which would cost approximately $200 million. Much attention 
recently has been focused on the conversion effort, but the replacement of the 
reactor and its decommissioning is an important issue for the future.  
The radiochemical plant became operational in 1964 and is designed to reprocess 
spent nuclear fuel from the plutonium production reactors. This plant was to be 
replaced by the RT-2 radiochemical plant which was designed for the storage and 
reprocessing of VVER-1000 power reactor fuel. At present, only the spent fuel 
storage pools of the RT-2 plant have been built.  
Given the large volume of radioactive waste that the facility has to manage, 
Krasnoyarsk-26 has developed a new technology for the immobilization of 
plutonium sludge. It is based on a porous ceramic matrix that would then be 
embedded in glass. Experiments on this technology have been started and the 
process holds some potential for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium.  
Another very promising area of conversion activity is the production of superpure 
and semiconducting materials for the electronics industry. One key project in this 
area is the collaboration of Krasnoyarsk-26 with the U.S. under the IPP and 
Defense Enterprise Fund on the ultimate construction of a 1,000 metric ton per 
year polycrystalline silicon factory. Pure, electronics grade silicon is a base 
material for the construction of semiconductors. Today Japan controls 
approximately 75 percent of the world production of silicon, with Germany 
supplying the remainder. Named the "Silicon of Siberia" project, this effort could 
establish Russia as a significant producer of silicon for its internal market and for 
export. It could also employ an estimated 1,000-3,000 workers at Krasnoyark-26. 
Other substances that Kransnoyarsk-26 is interested in producing include niobium, 
aluminum, and pure tellurium. In addition, the facility is working on the 
production of new electrical contacts, use of liquid CO2 at high pressure to extract 
nutrients from plants, and energy efficiency and conservation efforts.  
Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7)  
Tomsk-7 is a major plutonium production and uranium enrichment facility located 
near the city of Tomsk. It was founded in 1951 and currently employs 
approximately 15,000 workers. It has a yearly budget estimated at $50 million. 
Tomsk-7 production levels have actually risen about 30% over the low point 
experienced in 1994. The conversion philosophy of the Tomsk-7 leadership is 
primarily focused on utilizing its existing nuclear capabilities for peaceful 
purposes. This strategy is supplemented by the development of some non-nuclear 
technologies.  
Like Krasnoyarsk-26, Tomsk-7 still operates plutonium production reactors. 
There are two at this location. The conversion of the cores of these reactors is one 
area of new work. But the reactors will eventually have to be shut down. Since 
three similar reactors have already been shut down at Tomsk, there is 
considerable experience at the facility in safe decommissioning and preparation 
for long-term storage of plutonium production reactors. The plan is that the 
reactors would be conserved for 100 years (and possibly stored forever). Tomsk-7 
has no goal of returning the reactors sites to "green fields".  
Since the two production reactors still produce heat and electricity for the region, 
replacement sources of energy must be found. There is a "Plan on Nuclear Power 
Development in Tomsk-7" which outlines a strategy for new nuclear reactors to 
be built in two phases. The first is a district heating plant of a VK-300 type. 
Second would be construction of a high temperature gas-cooled reactor. The 
HTGR would be connected to Russia's plutonium disposition efforts because 
Tomsk-7 plans to fabricate the HTGR MOX fuel from plutonium. However, 
sufficient funding is not yet available to implement these reactor plans.  
Tomsk-7 also has plans to change the operation of its radiochemical plant over 
time. At present, the plant processes the spent fuel that is discharged from the two 
plutonium production reactors. When this mission, and other waste processing 
related activities, are completed (sometime after the reactor cores are converted) 
the plant will be shutdown. The decommissioning of this facility will be very 
difficult. A non-radioactive part of the facility would then be used to extract rare-
earth metals from a mine in Kuzbass. Under this proposal the workforce at the 
radiochemical plant would be cut by a factor of two. There were no proposals 
related to clean-up of irradiated sites or treatment of the radioactive waste that has 
been injected into the ground. The Tomsk-7 leadership is convinced that the 
injected liquid waste is safely contained underground.  
One area of conversion that is producing results today is the blending down of 
highly-enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons under the U.S.-Russian 
agreement to turn 500 metric tons of HEU into low-enriched nuclear reactor fuel. 
This activity has been a major generator of jobs at the facility and it was estimated 
that 80% of the capacity of the weapons plant is occupied with this task. The 
Tomsk-7 leadership stated that no state funding is being provided to carry out this 
work but that considerable income was being derived for Tomsk-7 from this 
activity. In addition, Tomsk-7 has substantial foreign contracts for uranium 
processing which have been a source of job growth.  
In the non-nuclear area, Tomsk has developed a number of technologies that 
potentially could be commercialized. These include plasma technologies to 
produce ultra-fine powders of metals for use in ceramic products, the creation of 
strong magnets, and the production of salts for use in rechargeable batteries. A 
small ceramics plant has been established but international cooperation and 
funding are required for the project to advance.  
Mayak Production Association (Chelyabinsk-65)  
The Mayak Production Association is one of Russia's primary plutonium 
processing and storage facilities. It is located near the city of Chelyabinsk and is 
estimated to employ approximately 18,000 people. Its yearly budget is estimated 
to be $60 million. The conversion plan for Mayak is based on the continuation of 
its plutonium processing and storage activities and the construction of reactors 
and facilities for use in the disposition of excess weapons plutonium.  
A major activity at Mayak is the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel fromVVER-
440 reactors. This plant employs approximately 1,500 people. To date this activity 
has separated about 30 tons of reactor-grade plutonium. The Mayak leadership 
plans to reprocess VVER-440 fuel into the future.  
Another primary activity of Mayak is storage of plutonium, highly-enriched 
uranium and spent nuclear fuel. The reactor-grade plutonium that has been 
separated by the facilities' reprocessing activities is in storage at the site. While 
security improvements are being made, a better storage facility would be 
welcomed and could be a first step toward the placement of this material under 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The plant is also in the process 
of constructing a storage facility for the spent fuel from naval nuclear reactors. 
This facility will allow one-third of the naval nuclear fuel to be stored at Mayak 
but it will cost about $10 million to complete. Mayak, in conjunction with the 
United States, is also constructing a new storage facility for the plutonium and 
highly-enriched uranium components from dismantled warheads. This facility 
will hold approximately 50,000 containers of warhead components.  
Because of the storage of large amounts of plutonium at Mayak, the plant is 
focused on constructing reactors and facilities to aid in the disposition of the 
plutonium that is declared excess. One element of the plan is to construct three 
BN-800 fast neutron reactors that could burn plutonium fuel. This is on hold 
because of lack of funds and disputes with the local authorities. The other major 
component is to construct a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant under a 
cooperative arrangement with France and Germany. At present this plant is not 
fully funded.  
Outside of its plutonium operations, Mayak has some other conversion activities 
underway. These include the production of isotopes, technologies for 
environmental clean-up and possible cooperation with Chelyabinsk-70 on the 
production of fiber optic cables.  
ANNEX FOUR 
 Activities Recommended for First Year Joint Funding 
The following is a proposal for activities that should be funded in the first year of 
a new initiative on converting the nuclear weapons complex.  
Expand Nuclear Security Cooperation  
o Establish non-proliferation centers at 3 locations 
o Develop cooperative technical means of monitoring warheads, 
components and fissile material 
o Reconstruct past fissile material and warhead production and report on 
totals 
o Expand plutonium disposition cooperation, including conversion of 
plutonium pits 
o Establish laboratory and university fellowships 
o Convene conference on the lessons learned from the U.S. nuclear complex 
conversion effort 
Total ----------------- $21 million 
Cooperate on Environmental Restoration  
o Evaluate ISTC & IPP funded projects 
o Expand joint R&D efforts 
o Analyze U.S. developed technologies 
o Assess Krasnoyarsk-26 immobilization technology 
o Utilize Russian Test Beds 
o Convene conference to discuss common environmental problems 
Total ----------------- $24 million 
Support Technology Evaluation and Commercialization  
o Evaluate Russian-proposed technologies 
o Create commercial project Tiger Teams 
o Train new business and commercialization specialists 
o Create joint issues review team 
o Establish basis for initial capitalization 
Total ----------------- $15 million 
Total First Year Funding -------------------- $ 60 million 
ANNEX FIVE 
 U.S.-Russian Cooperative Programs 
Since 1991, the U.S. and Russia have initiated a number of cooperative programs 
focused on non-proliferation and the conversion of the defense complex. The 
cumulative U.S. funding for these efforts is approximately $2.7 billion. A brief 
description of these programs are listed below.  
Cooperative Threat Reduction: Also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, this 
Department of Defense financed effort to assist in reducing and controlling 
weapons of mass destruction in the Former Soviet Union, has a few projects 
focused on the closed nuclear cities. Most prominent are the construction of a new 
fissile material storage facility at Mayak and the provision of funding for the 
conversion of the cores of the remaining plutonium production reactors.  
Defense Enterprise Fund: The DEF is an independent, not-for-profit U.S. 
corporation that was created in 1994 by the Department of Defense through CTR 
funds. DEF assists in the conversion and privatization process of excess military 
industrial capacity by providing financial assistance for U.S.-FSU business 
partnerships. At present, DEF is involved in one major project at a closed city. It 
is the development of the business plan and financing for the silicon purification 
facility at Krasnoyarsk-26.  
International Science and Technology Center: The ISTC is the largest program 
focused on the redirection of weapons scientists to peaceful activities. Funded by 
the European Union, the United States and Japan, the ISTC provides short-term, 
tax free grants to scientists to engage in peaceful, non-weapons work. At present 
Russian scientists at closed nuclear cities are working on over 140 projects under 
ISTC grants and approximately $29 million has been allocated to projects in the 
five closed cities covered by the RANSAC recommendations.  
Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program: There are a variety of laboratory-to-
laboratory interactions between the U.S. and Russia and most are overseen by the 
Department of Energy. The most prominent activity to date is the joint laboratory 
effort to improve the protection, control and accounting of weapon-usable nuclear 
materials. This program has established collaborations with all the closed nuclear 
cities in Russia, except those solely devoted to the dismantlement of nuclear 
warheads.  
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: The IPP was created to foster partnerships 
between U.S. industry, the U.S. national laboratories and the science and 
engineering institutes of the FSU. IPP supports a number of projects at the closed 
nuclear cities, with the silicon fabrication plant at Krasnoyarsk-26 being the most 
prominent. To date, IPP has allocated over $11 million for projects in the five 
closed cities covered by the RANSAC recommendations. The program is 
administered by the Department of Energy.  
Purchase of Excess Weapon-Grade Uranium: Under this agreement the U.S. has 
committed to purchase 500 tons of weapon grade uranium from Russia. This 
material is blended down to low enriched uranium before shipment to the U.S. 
and is ultimately used as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. This agreement is 
worth $12 billion and is providing substantial work for a few of the closed nuclear 
cities including Tomsk-7, Chelyabinsk-65, Krasnoyarsk-45 and Sverdlovsk-44.  
Cooperative Environmental Management: This small program, managed by the 
Department of Energy, is focused on generating cooperation with Russian 
scientific institutes on the development of environmental management 
technologies. It works with a small number of the closed nuclear cities.  
Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States: This Department 
of Commerce program uses funding from the Agency for International 
Development to assist small and large U.S. companies that are interested in doing 
business in the NIS. A major contribution is the publication of information on 
many sectors of the NIS economies. The program does not figure prominently in 
the nuclear cities conversion effort.  
American Business Centers: This program, managed by the Department of 
Commerce, has eleven locations in Russia which provide logistical and secretarial 
assistance to small and medium sized firms. These areas include Nizhny 
Novgorod, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg, though little work has been done with 
the nuclear cities in these areas.  
Special American Business Internship Training: SABIT provides grants to 
American companies to help defray the cost of hosting NIS managers and 
scientists for three to six months of training in the United States. The goal is to 
introduce Russians to western business practices, a process useful in the nuclear 
cities conversion process. The program is managed by the Department of 
Commerce.  
Russian Defense Business Directories: The goal of this Department of Commerce 
publication is to disseminate information about Russian enterprises to U.S. firms 
interested in investing in Russia. The directory has entries on many of the closed 
nuclear cities.  
Overseas Private Investment Corporation: This independent U.S. federal agency 
encourages U.S. investment in the NIS by extending loans, insuring investors 
against political risks, and conducting investment missions that allow enterprises 
to meet potential U.S. investors. To date, OPIC has not provided any funding for 
the conversion of the closed nuclear cities.  
Trade and Development Agency: This is another independent U.S. federal agency 
that seeks to assist U.S. companies in seeking business opportunities in the NIS 
and other countries. TDA has funded a feasibility study related to the fossil 
energy sources that could replace the closed plutonium production reactors at 
Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26.  
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